Bounded Privacy: Formalising the Trade-Off Between Privacy and Quality of Service by Hartmann, Lukas
cbe doi:10.18420/sicherheit2018_23
H. Langweg, M. Meier, B.C. Witt, D. Reinhardt et al. (Hrsg.): Sicherheit 2018,
Lecture Notes in Informatics (LNI), Gesellschaft für Informatik, Bonn 2018 253
Bounded Privacy: Formalising the Trade-Off Between
Privacy and Quality of Service
Lukas Hartmann1
Abstract: Many services and applications require users to provide a certain amount of information
about themselves in order to receive an acceptable quality of service (QoS). Exemplary areas of
use are location based services like route planning or the reporting of security incidents for critical
infrastructure. Users putting emphasis on their privacy, for example through anonymization, therefore
usually suffer from a loss of QoS. Some services however, may not even be feasible above a certain
threshold of anonymization, resulting in unacceptable service quality. Hence, there need to be
restrictions on the applied level of anonymization. To prevent the QoS from dropping below an
unacceptable threshold, we introduce the concept of Bounded Privacy, a generic model to describe
situations in which the achievable level of privacy is bounded by its relation to the service quality.
We furthermore propose an approach to derive the optimal level of privacy for both discrete and
continuous data.
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1 Introduction
In the last years, methods to collect and process personal data have been dramatically
improved and are widely used nowadays. Some of these systems could be used for tracking
individuals or to obtain more personal information by aggregating existing data. As a
consequence, some users wish to reveal as little personal data as possible and to stay private.
One widely used approach is the anonymization of sensitive data so that the reported data
cannot be easily mapped to a specific subject. For some services however, exactly this
sensitive data may be actually necessary for operation.
Location information can be highly sensitive, revealing not only specific locations like
home or work, but also for example religious or political views. By only knowing the home
and work location of a subject, one can reveal the identity of an anonymous individual
with a very high probability [GP09]. If location information is tracked over time, one can
infer even more personal data of this user. Therefore, Location Privacy is very important
for privacy-conscious users. Location Privacy is defined as a state when the location of
a subject is not revealed to other subjects. A widely-used approach is the obfuscation of
the exact geographical location and consequent reporting of the obfuscated information.
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Nevertheless, location based services (LBS) require location data to work properly and they
require a certain precision in this data to provide their service with an acceptable level of
quality. For mobile route planning with a feasible quality, a precise geographical information
for start and target location has to be submitted by the user to the LBS. Reporting highly
anonymized geo-coordinates would not be sufficent and would result in a unacceptable
service quality. The routing app would be useless. On the contrary, there are apps for which
a rough location information would be sufficient. A weather app only needs the city or at
most the postal code, but no precise address information. When using LBS, there is always
a trade-off between the quality of service (QoS) and the amount of location privacy a user
can obtain. Depending on the individual service and use case, the user has to accept less
privacy, if appropriate quality should not fall below a certain threshold.
Stipulated by German law, operators of critical infrastructure in Germany have to report
security incidents to the Federal Office for Information Security (Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik, BSI). Critical infrastructure in this context is divided in different
industrial sectors covering "classicalïnfrastructure like transportation, energy and water, but
also IT infrastructure, cultural sites and media. The law permits however that incidents can
be reported with related data partially anonymized, so that the operator does not have to
reveal too much information about the affected business. This anonymization could be done
by for example by obfuscation of the geographical location, the time when the issue arose
or by a generalization of the infrastructure category. In any case, the reporting should still
contain enough information so that the incident can be treated by the BSI in an appropriate
way. If a coal power plant might suffer from a coal shortage due to issues with the internal
enterprise resource planning system, it is possibly sufficient to report the affected region
with a certain precision. However, if an IT incident leads to a critical damage to a power
plant, more precise information of the actual power plant is needed. In the scenario of
incident reporting, there is always a trade-off between the quality of reporting and the
amount of anonymization/privacy one can obtain. Depending on the actual incident, one
has to use less anonymization in order to provide enough information in the incident report.
In both scenarios we have a trade-off between anonymization and the quality of service,
where the achievable level of privacy is bounded by its relation to the service quality. To
prevent the QoS from dropping below an unacceptable threshold, we introduce the concept
of Bounded Privacy describing situations when the quality of anonymization is bounded by
an upper bound. We present a generic model to this problem and introduce methods how to
obtain Bounded Privacy depending on the given information. To the best of our knowledge,
this is the first paper which investigates privacy when the corresponding service shall have
a decent, pre-defined minimum quality.
2 Related Work
Several methods have been proposed in the literature to anonymize location informa-
tion. The probably best discussed concept is the notation of k-Anonymity introduced
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by Sweeney [Sw02]. An extension of this model called l-Diversity was introduced by
Machanavajjhala et al. [Ma07]. In a similar vein, Ağır et al. [Ağ16] try to mask semantic
information about visited locations by generalizing it along a hierarchical semantic tree.
Andrés et al. [An13] propose the idea of ε-Geo-Indistinguishability which attempts to
restrict the information leakage to an observing adversary by employing a perturbation
mechanism that obfuscates real location information in a probabilistic way. This approach
is based on the concept of Differential Privacy introduced by Dwork [Dw11], originally
proposed for statistical databases.
Literature shows a great variation in exchange formats used for the reporting of IT
security incidents. The most recent overview on this topic was presented by Menges and
Pernul [MP18] focusing on the on applicability of exchange formats for IT security incidents.
3 Bounded Privacy
As stated in the introduction, there is often a trade-off between privacy and the quality of
service. This leads to scenarios where a decent service quality has to be guaranteed and
thus the anonymization level has to be bounded. In this chapter, we introduce the approach
of Bounded Privacy leading to a feasible level of anonymization, that allows for the given
threshold on the service quality.
In general, an information consists of geographical coordinates and semantic information, for
example location tags, infrastructure categories, etc. Therefore we model the information I
as an element of the domain
D = R2 × S,
where the geographical information is given as a pair (x, y) ∈ R2 of coordinates and the
semantic information s ∈ S comes from a generic set. In most scenarios, S would be a
multi-dimensional space where each dimension would represent one semantic attribute.
A semantic information s ∈ S would be of the form s = (s1, s2, . . .) where s1 could for
example be a category (“energy“), s2 could be an impact category (“high impact“), etc.
When we anonymize an information to obtain privacy, we apply an anonymization function
AN : D → P(D), I 7→ AN(I)
to the original information I, consisting of the functions ANgeo : D → P(R2) and
ANsem : D → P(S) for obfuscating geographical and semantic information, respectively.
The anonymized or obfuscated information AN(I) is an element of the power set P(D) and
hence a subset of the information domain D, since common anonymization techniques use




For measuring how much two (possibly anonymized) pieces of information differ from each
other, we introduce a generic information distance which is given by
d : P(D) × P(D) → R2≥0.
It calculates both the geographical and semantic difference as non-negative numerical values.
Analogous to the anonymization function AN , the information distance d consists of two
functions dgeo and dsem to measure the geographical and semantic distance, respectively.
The threshold below which the quality of service shall not fall - and as a consequence
the bound on the level of privacy - is modelled via a restriction function r consisting of
rgeo, rsem : D → R. With this function, we can define when an anonymization is valid with
respect to the given threshold restrictions: An anonymization of a given information I is
valid if
d({I}, AN(I)) ≤ r(I)
i.e. if both restrictions dgeo({I}, ANgeo(I)) ≤ rgeo(I) and dsem({I}, ANsem(I)) ≤ rsem(I) on
the information distance between original information I and anonymized information AN(I)
are fulfilled.
Depending on the use case and the individual information, one could have different
restrictions which level of anonymization can be applied. As the level of allowed restrictions
is dependent on the information quality necessary for the lower bound on the quality of
service, its definition should be determined at least in part by the service provider. The
restriction function r is also dependent on certain parts of the information I. Following the
previously used example from section 1 comparing between a coal shortage and a nuclear
melt-down, this means, that the restriction function r(I) would have a smaller value in
the latter case although both examples come from the same domain. One can see that the
function r can have a significantly different figure within even a single scenario.
We call the concept Bounded Privacy, when the level of anonymization is bounded by a
minimum level of service quality and therefore valid anonymization with respect to the
given restriction function is necessary.
4 Methods for Obtaining Bounded Privacy
In the generic model from section 3, an information I consists of data from discrete
and continuous domains. Geographic information is normally given by continuous geo-
coordinates (x, y) ∈ R2, whereas semantic data is normally given as a tuple of discrete
values, like categories, sectors or location tags.
To implement Bounded Privacy for discrete data, a bottom-up based tree approach could
be used: The discrete information units represent the leafs of a tree. Related units can be
grouped together and get a common parent node in the tree, representing the aggregated
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information of its child nodes within a topical hierarchy. Instead of reporting the exact
semantic information on the leaf level, one would report the aggregated information given
by the parent nodes to anonymize the exact information. The further away from the leaves
we move, the less detailed information is reported and therefore the anonymization is better.
Following the example of critical infrastructure, categories like “Nuclear Power Plant“
and “Coal Power Plant“ could be leafs of the semantic tree and could be grouped together
to the obfuscated category “Fossil Energy Power Plant“. This parent category could be
anonymized to the more general category “Power Plant“ or even to “Energy“. There are
already efforts to create similarly structured semantic ontologies for different sectors that
could be used as a basis for such topical hierarchies. This is an ongoing topic of research
and could prove an important piece to bridge the gap between our theoretical model and
practical applicability [SS10]. For measuring the information distance d, one could use the
graph metric dG which calculates the length of the shortest path between two given nodes.
If a restriction rsem(I) is applicable for a given information I, it is only allowed to step that
far in the semantic graph such that dG(I, ANsem(I)) ≤ rsem(I).
For the anonymization of data derived from a continuous domain, an approach based
on the concept of ε-Geo-Indistinguishability could be used. Originally, this mechanism
was proposed for geographical data only, but one can adapt it for other domains of
continuous data as well. The main idea of ε-Geo-Indistinguishability is the following: With
a perturbation mechanism K , a geo-coordinate (x, y) ∈ R2 is mapped to another point
(x∗, y∗) in a “probabilistic way“. The obfuscated point will then be reported instead of
the original location. Andrés et al. [An13] propose to use a two-dimensional Laplacian
distribution which creates noise and obfuscates the geographical location. This mechanism
can be used as anonymization function ANgeo. The distribution of the Laplacian noise
highly depends on the parameter ε and influences the level of perturbation. Therefore,
the restriction function rgeo has to restrict the distribution of the Laplacian noise so that
the obfuscated points are not too far away from the original geographical location with a
high probability. Since the anonymized geographical-information is given in probabilistic
way, the information distance dgeo must also be measured probabilistically. A suitable
approach for the restriction function rgeo would be to introduce a radius s around the
original geo-coordinate (x, y) in which the obfuscated point (x∗, y∗) should be mapped with
at least probability p. This probability would be dependent on the information I so that in
some scenarios higher probabilities could be used as in others. In order to keep our model
deterministic, we propose to redraw the obfuscated point (x∗, y∗), if the distance to the
original point (x, y) is higher than allowed by our restriction function, to ensure that the
QoS cannot drop below the specified bound.
5 Conclusion
We presented a generic model to the problem when privacy is bounded such that a minimum
Quality of Service has to be guaranteed. We introduced generic anonymization functions and
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tools formeasuring and restricting the information distance between original and anonymized
information. Furthermore, basic approaches on how to apply these concepts to discrete and
continuous data were given. For the discrete domain, we used a tree-based approach in
which a broader semantic tag/category shall be reported as long as this is valid with respect
to the restriction function. A method which is based on ε-Geo-Indistinguishability was
used for continuous geographical data. Noise was added to the original location following a
planar Laplacian distribution.
In future work, it is envisioned to evaluate the generic model of Bounded Privacy on a real
data example and define restriction functions for a concrete scenario like incident reporting.
Furthermore, we want to extend the generic model so that upper bounds on the provided
information are included as well. Another possible extension of the model would be the
introduction of an evaluation mechanism for the reported information so that for example
the monetary value of the anonymized information could be measured. With this approach,
one could also investigate in which circumstances it might have a positive effect for a subject
to report more information than needed, if this reporting has some benefits. Based on these
two extensions, one could even quantitatively formalize the trade-off between privacy and
QoS, thus enabling users to pick the optimal privacy level for their needs and ultimately
realizing their informational self-determination.
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